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Does the approval mechanism induce the effcient extraction in Common Pool Resource games?

Koffi Serge William Yao, Emmanuelle Lavaine & Marc Willinger
Year of publication:
[2021]
Authors: Yao, Koffi Serge William ; Lavaine, Emmanuelle ; Willinger, Marc
Publisher: Montpellier : CEE-M, Center for Environmental Economics
Subject: Gemeingüter | Commons | Spieltheorie | Game theory
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