Does the external monitoring effect of financial analysts deter corporate fraud in China?
Year of publication: |
April 2016
|
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Authors: | Chen, Jiandong ; Cumming, Douglas J. ; Hou, Wenxuan ; Lee, Edward |
Published in: |
Journal of business ethics : JOBE. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0167-4544, ZDB-ID 868017-6. - Vol. 134.2016, 4, p. 727-742
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Subject: | Fraud triangle | Corporate fraud | Agency problem | Analyst coverage | China | Betrug | Fraud | Finanzanalyse | Financial analysis | Wirtschaftskriminalität | Economic crime | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Bilanzdelikt | Accounting fraud |
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