Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity are equivalent

It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. This generalizes some known results.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Takamiya, Koji
Publisher:	Osaka : Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Subject:	Neue politische Ökonomie \| Koalition \| Allokation \| Theorie \| social choice function \| coalition strategy-proofness \| Maskin monotonicity

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Series:	ISER Discussion Paper ; 668
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	517766159 [GVK] hdl:10419/92807 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332423