Domestic versus External Borrowing and Fiscal Policy in Emerging Markets
This paper presents a model of an emerging market sovereign that can selectively default on its domestic or external creditors. The two classes of creditors have different ways of punishing the government in the event of default, which in turn creates a differential in the sovereign's incentives to default on its domestic versus foreign creditors. We explore the extent to which the possibility of differential treatment of creditors affects the composition of debt. We find that a country characterized by volatile output, sovereign risk, and costly tax collection will want to borrow in domestic as well as in international markets. Copyright © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Vasishtha, Garima |
Published in: |
Review of International Economics. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0965-7576. - Vol. 18.2010, 5, p. 1058-1074
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
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