Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

Helmuts Azacis

I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium the set of true envy-free allocations.

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Year of publication:	December 2005
Authors:	Azacis, Helmuts
Publisher:	Cardiff, United Kingdom : Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University
Subject:	Indivisible Goods \| Envy-Freeness \| Implementation \| Strong Nash Equilibrium \| Marktmechanismus \| Market mechanism \| Unteilbare Güter \| Indivisible goods \| Preis \| Price \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Theorie \| Theory