Double-sided moral hazard, information screening and the optimal contract

Jin Xue and Yiwen Fei

Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Xue, Jin ; Fei, Yiwen
Published in:	China finance review international. - Bingley : Emerald, ISSN 2044-1398, ZDB-ID 2681650-7. - Vol. 6.2016, 4, p. 404-431
Subject:	Information asymmetry \| Venture capital \| Double-sided moral hazard \| Information screening \| Optimal contract \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Risikokapital \| Vertrag \| Contract \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Adverse Selektion \| Adverse selection \| Signalling

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