Dupuit conjecture for constrained screening: Overall distortion and type-partitioning

In screening with non-concave costs: (i) cycles of active IC constraints can make all packages distorted; (ii) standard screening can be less profitable than price discrimination within a consumer type using first-come-first-served rationing.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Kokovin, Sergey ; Nahata, Babu ; Zhelobodko, Evgeny
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 118.2013, 3, p. 439-441
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Screening \| Nonlinear pricing \| Non-concave cost \| Capacity constraint \| Overall inefficiency

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010688082