Dynamic assignment without money : optimality of spot mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2025
|
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Authors: | Combe, Julien ; Nora, Vladyslav ; Tercieux, Olivier |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 20.2025, 1, p. 255-301
|
Subject: | course allocation | dynamic matching | Market design | Matching | Allokation | Allocation | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency |
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