Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents whose private information changes across time. Within each of these settings, we discuss both efficient (welfare-maximizing) and optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanisms.

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Year of publication:	2010-03
Authors:	Bergemann, Dirk ; Said, Maher
Institutions:	Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Subject:	Dynamic auctions and mechanisms \| Random arrivals and departures \| Changing private information \| Incentive compatibility

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	CFP 1325 Published in J.J. Cochran, L.A. Cox, P. Keskinocak, J.P. Kharoufeh, and J.C. Smith, eds. Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 2, Wiley, 2011, pp. 1511-1522 The price is None Number 1757R 16 pages
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008505985