Dynamic contracting with many agents
Alternative title: | Money and taxes implement optimal dynamic contracts |
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Year of publication: |
February 2024
|
Authors: | Biais, Bruno ; Gersbach, Hans ; Rochet, Jean-Charles ; Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig von ; Villeneuve, Stéphane |
Publisher: |
[Toulouse] : [Toulouse School of Economics] |
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
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