Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states

We consider a class of dynamic games in which each player’s actions are unobservable to the other players and each player’s actions can influence a state variable that is unobservable to the other players. We develop an algorithm that solves for the subset of sequential equilibria in which equilibrium strategies depend on private information only through the privately observed state.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Cole, Harold L. ; Kocherlakota, Narayana
Institutions:	Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Subject:	Game theory

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Staff Report.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 254
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005367669