Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states

We consider the large class of dynamic games in which each player’s actions are unobservable to the other players, and each player’s actions can influence a state variable that is unobservable to the other players. We develop an algorithm that solves for the subset of sequential equilibria in which equilibrium strategies are Markov in the privately observed state.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Cole, Harold L. ; Kocherlakota, Narayana R.
Institutions:	Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Subject:	Game theory

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	German
Notes:	Number 583
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005526367