Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding.
The model features a dynamic market in steady state in which prices ar e determined in first-price auctions. It combines competition over ti me, familiar from the pairwise meeting models, with instantaneous bid ding competition. It inquires how different properties of the model d etermine the relative importance of these two aspects of the competit ion and, in particular, how the non-market-clearing price result of t he matching and bargaining models is affected by the introduction of instantaneous bidding competition. If there is some heterogeneity in buyers' valuations of the traded goods, then, when the market is fric tionless enough, the instantaneous bidding competition effectively di sappears and the non-market-clearing price result can obtain. Copyright 1988 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Year of publication: |
1988
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Authors: | Wolinsky, Asher |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Studies. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0034-6527. - Vol. 55.1988, 1, p. 71-84
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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