Dynamic mechanism design for a global commons

Rodrigo Harrison; Roger Lagunoff

Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Harrison, Rodrigo ; Lagunoff, Roger D.
Publisher:	Washington, DC : Georgetown Univ., Dep. of Economics
Subject:	Optimal quota \| full compression \| fish wars \| Perfect Bayesian equilibria \| international agency \| climate change \| Klimawandel \| Climate change \| Quotenregulierung \| Quantity regulation \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Gemeingüter \| Commons \| Vollkommene Information \| Complete information \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory

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