Dynamic Optimization of Cooperation on Energy- Saving And Propaganda in Green Building Supply Chain Under Government Subsidies

The construction industry consumes a significant amount of resources. It is an urgent need to promote green building (GB) practices . Aimed at solving the problem of energy-saving, propaganda and government subsidy strategies in the green building supply chain (GBSC), a differential game model of the GBSC consisting of suppliers and developers were constructed with government participation. Taking both GB energy saving and goodwill as state variables, and considering the fact that the demand was affected by both GB energy-saving and goodwill, the feedback equilibrium strategies of the government and the supply chain under different decisions was analysed. The results show that the cost-sharing contracts can achieve Pareto improvement in the profits of suppliers and developers under certain conditions, when there is no government subsidy, and the energy saving, goodwill and demand of GB are increased. Besides, the optimal energy-saving efforts of suppliers, the optimal propaganda efforts of developers, and the optimal subsidy coefficients of the government are not related to time when there is government subsidy. The government subsidies offered to GBSC members is related to the structure and status of game. Moreover, government subsidies play an effective role in regulating the profit distribution of enterprises in the GBSC