Dynamic principal-agent models

Philipp Renner and Karl Schmedders

Year of publication:	[2017]
Authors:	Renner, Philipp ; Schmedders, Karl
Publisher:	Lancester : Lancaster University Management School
Subject:	Optimal unemployment tax \| principal–agent model \| repeated moral hazard \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Theorie \| Theory \| Arbeitslosigkeit \| Unemployment \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive

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