Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions

Francesc Dilmé

Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Dilmé, Francesc
Published in:	Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 113.2019, p. 116-136
Subject:	Dynamic moral hazard \| Dynamic signaling \| Endogenous effort \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Signalling \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Produktqualität \| Product quality \| Dynamisches Spiel \| Dynamic game \| Dynamische Wirtschaftstheorie \| Economic dynamics

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