Dynamically consistent intergenerational welfare

Dynamic consistency is crucial for credible evaluation of intergenerational choice plans that inherently lack commitment. We offer a general characterization for dynamically consistent intergenerational welfare aggregation. The aggregation is characterized by envy-guilt asymmetry in discounting with respect to future generations' utility: Higher utility than future generations' utility is discounted differently than lower utility than future generations' utility. This offers a simple and tractable characterization for the dynamically consistent choice rules.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2024
Authors:	Mononen, Lasse
Publisher:	Bielefeld : Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Subject:	Dynamic consistency \| discounting \| social discount factor \| preference aggregation

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Series:	Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; 687
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	1881426009 [GVK] hdl:10419/286388 [Handle]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014494946