Dynamics of contract design with screening
Jakša Cvitanić; Xuhu Wan; Huali Yang
| Year of publication: |
2013
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Cvitanić, Jakša ; Wan, Xuhu ; Yang, Huali |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 59.2013, 5, p. 1229-1244
|
| Subject: | adverse selection | constant private shock | principal–agent model | continuous time | continuation value | temptation value | dynamic moral hazard | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Schock | Shock |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751111