Dynamics of intrahousehold bargaining

This paper studies the dynamics of bargaining in an intrahousehold context. To explore long-term partner relationships, we analyse bilateral bargaining by considering that spouses take decisions sequentially. We conclude that a greater valuation of the present, rather than the future, for the spouse who takes the second decision, increases the set of possible sustainable agreements, as well as the proportion of time that this agent devotes to a family good.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Andaluz, Joaquín ; Marcén, Miriam ; Molina, José Alberto
Publisher:	Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Subject:	Familienökonomik \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Extensives Spiel \| Theorie \| Family bargaining \| Stackelberg game \| family good

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Series:	IZA Discussion Papers ; 3757
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	582912342 [GVK] hdl:10419/35309 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268945