Economic elites and the constitutional design of sharing political power
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Paniagua, Victoria ; Vogler, Jan P. |
Published in: |
Constitutional political economy. - Getzville,NY : HeinOnline, ISSN 1572-9966, ZDB-ID 2015078-7. - Vol. 33.2022, 1, p. 25-52
|
Subject: | Economic elites | Power-sharing institutions | Institutional design | Political economy | Elite competition | Elite | Theorie | Theory | Macht | Power | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Verfassungsökonomik | Constitutional economics |
-
A constitutional theory of intergenerational equity
Ribeiro, Gonçalo de Almeida, (2021)
-
Constitutionalism in an old key : legality and constituent power
Dyzenhaus, David, (2011)
-
Exchange, unanimity and consent: a defence of the public choice account of power
Meadowcroft, John, (2013)
- More ...
-
Economic Elites and the Constitutional Design of Sharing Political Power
Paniagua, Victoria, (2021)
-
Moving markets? Government bond investors and microeconomic policy changes
Mosley, Layna, (2020)
-
When clients vote for brokers : how elections improve public goods provision in urban slums
Paniagua, Victoria, (2022)
- More ...