Effectiveness of the approval mechanism in a three-player common pool resource dilemma
Year of publication: |
2024
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Authors: | Yao, Koffi Serge William ; Lavaine, Emmanuelle ; Willinger, Marc |
Published in: |
Journal of behavioral and experimental economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 2214-8043, ZDB-ID 2763246-5. - Vol. 109.2024, Art.-No. 102179, p. 1-16
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Subject: | Approval mechanism | Common pool resources | Unanimity and majority rules | Difference in difference | Gemeingüter | Commons | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods |
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