Efficiency in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with imperfect private monitoring

Kyna Fong; Yuliy Sannikov

Year of publication:	28 Febr. 2007
Other Persons:	Fong, Kyna (contributor) ; Sannikov, Yuliy (contributor)
Publisher:	Berkeley, Calif. : Univ. of California, Inst. of Business and Economic Research, Dep. of Economics
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Gefangenendilemma \| Prisoner's dilemma \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Leistungsbeurteilung \| Employee performance appraisal

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