Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings.

We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Ettinger, David
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine
Subject:	Auctions \| Crossholdings \| Efficiency

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in Economics Letters (2003) v.80, p.1-7
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008799425