Efficient Collective Decision-Making, Marginal Cost Pricing, And Quadratic Voting

We trace the developments that led to quadratic voting, from Vickrey's counterspeculation mechanism and his second-price auction through the family of Groves mechanisms and its most notable member, the Clarke mechanism, to the expected externality mechanism, the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, and the Hylland-Zeckhauser mechanism. We show that these mechanisms are all applications of the fundamental insight that for a process to be efficient, all partiesinvolved must bear the marginal costs of their actions

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Tideman, T. Nicolaus
Other Persons:	Plassmann, Florenz (contributor)
Publisher:	[2016]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Grenzkostenpreis \| Marginal cost pricing \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule

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