Efficient division when preferences are private : using the expected externality mechanism

Christina Aperjis (Power Auctions LLC), Maciej H. Kotowski (Harvard Kennedy School), Richard J. Zeckhauser (Harvard Kennedy School)

Year of publication:	March 19, 2019
Authors:	Aperjis, Christina ; Kotowski, Maciej H. ; Zeckhauser, Richard
Publisher:	[Cambridge, MA] : Harvard Kennedy School, John F. Kennedy School of Government
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Externer Effekt \| Externalities

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