Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
Year of publication: |
May 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | He, Wei ; Li, Jiangtao |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 97.2016, p. 166-173
|
Subject: | Dynamic mechanism design | Efficiency | Observable payoff | Incentive compatibility | Budget balance | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Effizienz | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency |
-
"When Olson meets Dahl" : from inefficient groups formation to inefficient policy-making
Martimort, David, (2019)
-
Krishna, Vijay, (1998)
-
Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
Li, Yunan, (2019)
- More ...
-
Equivalence of Stochastic and Deterministic Mechanisms
Chen, Yi-Chun, (2019)
-
Correlation-Robust Auction Design
He, Wei, (2021)
-
Robustly Optimal Reserve Price
He, Wei, (2019)
- More ...