Efficient Inequityâ€“Averse Teams

This paper analyzes the efficiency of team production when agents exhibit other regarding preferences. It is shown that full efficiency can be sustained as an equilibrium through a budget-balancing mechanism that punishes some randomly chosen agents if output falls short of efficient level but distributes the output equally otherwise, provided that the agents are sufficiently inequity averse.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2007-05
Authors:	Li, Jianpei
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	moral hazard \| team production \| inequity aversion

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739677