Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
Year of publication: |
Februrary 15, 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Li, Yunan |
Publisher: |
Philadelphia, PA : Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania |
Subject: | Auctions | Mechanism Design | Information Acquisition | Efficiency | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour |
-
Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
Li, Yunan, (2019)
-
Competing through information provision
Forand, Jean Guillaume, (2013)
-
Competing through information provision
Forand, Jean Guillaume, (2012)
- More ...
-
Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
Li, Yunan, (2021)
-
Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
Li, Yunan, (2021)
-
ENDOGENOUS LABOR MARKET CYCLES
Li, Yunan, (2021)
- More ...