Efficient Networks for a Class of Games with Global Spillovers

In this paper we examine efficient networks in network formation games with global spillovers that satisfy convexity and sub-modularity properties. Unlike the previous literature we impose these properties on individual payoff functions. We establish that efficient networks of this class of games are nested split graphs. This allows us to complete the work of Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Westbrock (2010) on collaborative oligopoly networks

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Billand, Pascal
Other Persons:	Bravard, Christophe (contributor) ; Durieu, Jacques (contributor) ; Sarangi, Sudipta (contributor)
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spillover-Effekt \| Spillover effect \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Netzwerk \| Network \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (23 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 22, 2015 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2707233 [DOI]
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D85 - Network Formation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009710