Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions
Year of publication: |
1999
|
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Authors: | Hendricks, Kenneth ; Pinkse, Joris ; Porter, Robert H. |
Publisher: |
Evanston, IL : Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO) |
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Theorie |
Series: | CSIO Working Paper ; 0008 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 393597458 [GVK] hdl:10419/38684 [Handle] |
Source: |
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