Endogenous beliefs and institutional structure in competitive equilibrium with adverse selection
Year of publication: |
December 2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Jaynes, Gerald David |
Publisher: |
New Haven, Connecticut : Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University |
Subject: | Adverse selection | Sequential rationality | Screening | Signaling | Incentive compatibility | Insurance pooling | Adverse Selektion | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Signalling | Versicherungsökonomik | Economics of insurance | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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