Endogenous market structures in a mixed oligopoly with a public firm whose managerial contract is based on welfare and bargaining over the managerial contract of a private firm
Year of publication: |
August 2017
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Authors: | Nakamura, Yasuhiko |
Published in: |
Economia politica : journal of analytical and institutional economics. - [Bologna] : il Mulino, ISSN 1120-2890, ZDB-ID 852322-8. - Vol. 34.2017, 2, p. 189-209
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Subject: | Strategic contract | Mixed duopoly | Managerial delegation | Bargaining | Welfare | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Duopol | Duopoly | Öffentliches Unternehmen | Public enterprise | Führungskräfte | Managers | Privatwirtschaft | Private sector | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Wohlfahrtsanalyse | Welfare analysis | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Marktstruktur | Market structure | Vertrag | Contract |
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