Endogenous market structures in a mixed oligopoly with a public firm whose managerial contract is based on welfare and bargaining over the managerial contract of a private firm
Year of publication: |
August 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Nakamura, Yasuhiko |
Published in: |
Economia politica : journal of analytical and institutional economics. - [Bologna] : il Mulino, ISSN 1120-2890, ZDB-ID 852322-8. - Vol. 34.2017, 2, p. 189-209
|
Subject: | Strategic contract | Mixed duopoly | Managerial delegation | Bargaining | Welfare | Duopol | Duopoly | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Öffentliches Unternehmen | Public enterprise | Führungskräfte | Managers | Privatwirtschaft | Private sector | Marktstruktur | Market structure | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Wohlfahrtsanalyse | Welfare analysis |
-
Privatization versus managerial delegation : revisiting delegation in a mixed duopoly
Hamada, Kojun, (2025)
-
The endogenous objective function of a partially privatized firm : a Nash bargaining approach
Kamijo, Yoshio, (2014)
-
Subsidization and bargaining in mixed oligopolies
Cai, Dapeng, (2014)
- More ...
-
Biased managers as strategic commitment in a mixed duopoly with relative profit-maximizers
Nakamura, Yasuhiko, (2015)
-
Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with managerial delegation : a quadratic cost case
Nakamura, Yasuhiko, (2008)
-
Nakamura, Yasuhiko, (2023)
- More ...