Endogenous Organizational Forms in Multiproduct Mixed Duopoly

We analyze endogenous choice of organizational forms between U-form and M-form in the multiproduct mixed duopoly. With managerial delegation in public and private firms, we find that choosing M-form for the public and private firms is a dominant strategy under mixed duopoly in either Bertrand or Cournot competition. This is in contrast with the result obtained under privatization. In equilibrium, social welfare and consumer surplus with M-form under mixed duopoly are greater than those with U-form under privatization

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Choi, Kangsik
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Duopol \| Duopoly \| Theorie \| Theory \| Mehrproduktfertigung \| Multiproduct production \| Organisationsstruktur \| Organizational structure \| Öffentliches Unternehmen \| Public enterprise

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