Enfranchisement and the welfare state: Institutional design of unemployment compensation
This paper examines the relationship between various political mechanisms and the variation in unemployment compensation programs (i.e., compulsory, voluntary, and assistance programs). I argue that the choice of a specific unemployment compensation program over others depends on the level of franchise extension. Using a multinomial logit analysis of 13 European countries from 1880 to 1945, I find that among other political mechanisms, franchise extension had the greatest impact on the likelihood of instituting unemployment compensation, controlling socio-economic factors. Greater enfranchisement is associated with a higher probability of choosing a compulsory program, but not a voluntary one.
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kim, Wonik |
Published in: |
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics). - Elsevier, ISSN 2214-8043. - Vol. 37.2008, 4, p. 1660-1678
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Kim, Wonik, (2010)
-
Does Class Matter? Social Cleavages in South Korea's Electoral Politics in the Era of Neoliberalism
Kim, Wonik, (2010)
-
Sill, Kaitlyn Louise, (2010)
- More ...