Entry deterrence and collusion at repeated multiunit auctions of ITQs
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Peña-Torres, Julio ; Muñoz, Roberto ; Quezada, Felipe |
Published in: |
Marine resource economics. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. of Chicago Press, ISSN 2334-5985, ZDB-ID 2205767-5. - Vol. 37.2022, 4, p. 437-465
|
Subject: | Auctioning production (ITQ) rights | Chilean sea bass fishery | collusive bidding | English and Dutch auctions | entry deterrence | l70 | sequential multiunit auctions | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Markteintritt | Market entry | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Fischereipolitik | Fisheries policy | Auktion | Auction | Kartell | Cartel | Quotenregulierung | Quantity regulation |
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