Entry deterrence by timing rather than overinvestment in a strategic real options framework
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Huberts, N. F. D. ; Dawid, Herbert ; Huisman, K. J. M. ; Kort, Peter M. |
Published in: |
European journal of operational research : EJOR. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0377-2217, ZDB-ID 243003-4. - Vol. 274.2019, 1 (1.4.), p. 165-185
|
Subject: | Game theory | Incumbent/Entrant | Capacity choice | Investment under uncertainty | Real-option games | Realoptionsansatz | Real options analysis | Spieltheorie | Markteintritt | Market entry | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision | Investition | Investment | Duopol | Duopoly | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty |
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