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Entry in first-price auctions with signaling

Olivier Bos and Tom Truyts
Year of publication:
[2016]
Authors: Bos, Olivier ; Truyts, Tom
Publisher: Louvain-la-Neuve : Centre for Operations Research and Econometrics
Subject: Monotonic signaling | social status | first-price auction | entry | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Signalling | Markteintritt | Market entry | Sozialer Status | Social status | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Experiment
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