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Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior

Geir Asheim; Mark Voorneveld; Jörgen W. Weibull
This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies. -- epistemic game theory ; epistemic robustness ; rationalizability ; closedness under rational behavior ; mutual p-belief
Year of publication:
30 Mar. 2009
Authors: Asheim, Geir B. ; Voorneveld, Mark ; Weibull, Jörgen W.
Publisher: Stockholm : Ekonomiska Forskningsinst.
Subject: Rationalität | Rationality | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Robustes Verfahren | Robust statistics | Theorie | Theory
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