Epistemically stable strategy sets

This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Asheim, Geir B. ; Voorneveld, Max ; Weibull, Jörgen W.
Publisher:	Oslo : University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Subject:	Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Rationales Verhalten \| Lernprozess \| Spieltheorie \| Epistemic game theory \| epistemic stability \| rationalizability \| closedness under rational behavior \| mutual p-belief

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Series:	Memorandum ; 2010,01
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	617789126 [GVK] hdl:10419/47340 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285610