Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints

We propose a simple division of the costs of non-rival resources, when a user's need can be met by different subsets of the resources, and no resource is redundant. Our method is characterized by the Stand Alone core property, additivity in costs, and a symmetry requirement.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Moulin, Herve ; Laigret, Francois
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 72.2011, 1, p. 314-320
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Cost sharing Network Connectivity Stand alone core

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914613