Equilibria under deferred acceptance : dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Jaramillo, Paula ; Kayı, Çaǧatay ; Klijn, Flip |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 82.2013, p. 693-701
|
Subject: | Many-to-one matching | Deferred acceptance | Nash equilibrium | Dropping strategies | Filled positions | Welfare | Theorie | Theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Matching |
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