Equilibria under deferred acceptance : dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Jaramillo, Paula ; Kayı, Çaǧatay ; Klijn, Flip |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 82.2013, p. 693-701
|
Subject: | Many-to-one matching | Deferred acceptance | Nash equilibrium | Dropping strategies | Filled positions | Welfare | Theorie | Theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Matching |
-
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
Jaramillo, Paula, (2013)
-
Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare
Jaramillo, Paula, (2013)
-
Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare
Jaramillo, Paula, (2013)
- More ...
-
Rank gaps and the size of the core for roommate problems
Jaramillo, Paula, (2017)
-
School choice : Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms
Jaramillo, Paula, (2017)
-
The core of roommate problems : size and rank-fairness within matched pairs
Jaramillo, Paula, (2019)
- More ...