Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Schumacher, Heiner ; Thysen, Heidi Christina |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 17.2022, 1, p. 371-414
|
Subject: | Bayesian networks | principal-agent relationship | bounded rationality | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Begrenzte Rationalität | Bounded rationality | Rationale Erwartung | Rational expectations | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE4231 [DOI] hdl:10419/253529 [Handle] |
Classification: | D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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