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Equilibrium existence theorems for multi-leader-follower generalized multiobjective games in FC-spaces

Year of publication:
2012
Authors: Ding, Xie
Published in:
Journal of Global Optimization. - Springer. - Vol. 53.2012, 3, p. 381-390
Publisher: Springer
Subject: Multi-leader-follower generalized multiobjective games | Pareto equilibrium | FC-space
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Type of publication: Article
Source:
RePEc - Research Papers in Economics
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010896428
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