Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models

This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize the implications of these dynamics in simple bargaining games

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Binmore, Ken ; Samuelson, Larry ; Young, H. Peyton
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Gleichgewichtsmodell \| Equilibrium model \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Evolutionäre Spieltheorie \| Evolutionary game theory

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