Equilibrium selection in the spence signalling game

The paper studies the most simple version of the Spence job market signaling model in which there are just 2 types of workers while education is not productivity increasing. To eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria, the general equilibrium selection theory of John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten is applied. It is shown that this theory selects Wilson's E2-equilibrium as the solution.

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Year of publication:	1989-01
Authors:	Gueth, Werner ; Damme, Eric van
Institutions:	University of Bonn, Germany
Subject:	Inferior strategies in the uniformly pertubed game \| Spence job market \| Equilibria

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Series:	Discussion Paper Serie A.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Sonderforschungsbereich 303, University of Bonn, Germany
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032118