Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Schlegel, Jan Christoph |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 123.2020, p. 41-53
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Subject: | College admission | Deferred acceptance | Matching with contracts | Observable substitutes | Strategy-proofness | Substitutes | Matching | Hochschule | Higher education institution | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Studierende | Students | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Schulauswahl | School choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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