The dissertation consists of three chapters examining topics in corporate finance. In the first chapter, my co-author and I examine the efficiency gains from asset acquisitions. We propose a test that focuses specifically on whether anticipated synergies vary with a characteristic. We argue that the magnitude of the relationship between relative value and acquirer returns measures the degree of synergies associated with a particular set of acquisitions. We find that asset purchases generate positive synergies whereas mergers do not; mergers with private targets have positive synergies while mergers with public targets have negative synergies; and asset purchases by firms with better governance generate higher synergies. In the second chapter, I propose a model of IPO discounts with an issuer facing costs and benefits from an IPO that are proportional to issuer market capitalization. Oligopolistic IPO underwriters extract a fraction of the net benefits, generating the observed negative relationship between IPO underpricing and fraction of the firm sold during the IPO. I derive explicit empirical implications in terms of changes in this relationship arising from these factors. Tests of empirical predictions on data demonstrate consistency with the proposed model. Also consistent with the model, the fraction of the firm sold during the IPO is significantly different depending on these three factors. In the third chapter, my co-author and I study a contract in which management fees, incentive fees and a high water mark (HWM) provision drive a fund manager's effort and risk choices as well as the investor's walkaway decision. We model this relationship and calibrate the model to observed data. The model yields empirical predictions regarding the effect of a fund's distance from the HWM on effort, risk and walkaway behavior. Testing the model on empirical data, we find that as funds fall from the HWM, future expected returns fall, the incidence of fund closure increases and the variance of future returns increases. Finally, using the calibrated model, we consider welfare implications of changes to the standard 2/20 contract. Welfare results highlight the critical role higher management fees play in such contracts in terms of improving the manager's risk taking and effort expenditure decisions. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]